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Abstract
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equi-
librium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experi-
ment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to
implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-
two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity
(an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (ﬁrst ver-
sus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under
the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd
out equality and eﬃciency seeking.
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Procedural fairness, calling for equal treatment of all persons (like equal voting
rights or equal chances of promotion), is an important requirement of institu-
tional design in all the social sciences.1 Other situations appealing to procedural
fairness are sports contests where the rules for ranking individual athletes or
teams have to be fair, and where “fair play” requires players only to comply with
the rules without any reference to other-regarding concerns. Even in procedu-
rally unfair situations (e.g., the well known ultimatum experiments surveyed by
Camerer, 2003), however, the outcomes must by no means be unfair because in
small group interactions agents often exhibit other-regarding concerns.
We report here on an experiment designed to study whether such other-
regarding concerns mainly arouse in circumstances violating procedural fairness
or are inﬂuential even when the rules are procedurally fair. In other words, our
main research question is: do procedurally fair rules allow for more equilibrium
behavior or do people entertain other-regarding concerns beyond their interest
in procedural fairness? Addressing this question requires situations for which
we can deﬁne procedural fairness in a convincing way, e.g. by axiomatically
characterizing procedurally fair rules. One such situation is “bidding” for the
allocation of an indivisible commodity (G¨ uth, forthcoming). In this paper,
we therefore focus on bidding institutions. To easily evoke other-regarding
concerns, we provide complete information about reselling values and assume
competition of only two bidders.
We study four diﬀerent bidding rules varying, in a two-by-two factorial
design, the ownership of the good to be allocated (auctions versus fair division
games) and the price rule (ﬁrst versus second price). In an auction, the good is
owned by an outside party who sells it to the competing bidders in exchange for
1There has been a large amount of work on procedural fairness in the psychology literature
(for summaries of earlier research see, e.g., Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 2000; Konow,
2003). In contrast, economists have paid much less attention to fair procedures. Economic
studies focusing on the importance of procedural fairness to behavior include, e.g., Frey et
al. (2004), Bolton et al. (2005), Chlaß et al. (2009).
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bidders so that monetary compensation (from the winner to the losers) is called
for. The (sum of) payment(s) by the winner equals the highest bid under the
ﬁrst-price rule and the second-highest bid under the second-price rule.
We characterize a bidding rule as procedurally fair if it satisﬁes (1) the
axiom of envy-free net trades according to bids (i.e., given her bid no agent
should prefer another agent’s net trade to her own), and (2) the axiom of
equal stated proﬁts (i.e., the payoﬀs of all bidders are equal according to their
bids). These two axioms imply that the object must be awarded to the highest
bidder at a price equal to the highest bid that, in case of fair division games,
is equally distributed among all bidders. Therefore, whereas the ﬁrst price
rule is procedurally fair, the second price rule is not because it violates the
axiom of equal stated proﬁts.2 By comparing bidding behavior under these two
price rules, we can thus investigate whether guaranteeing procedural fairness
induces more self-interest (in the sense of benchmark bidding) and tempers
other-regarding concerns. Furthermore, procedurally fair rules may bring on
more “true value”-bidding.
In Section 2 we deﬁne procedurally fair bidding rules, whose solution behav-
ior for the case of complete payoﬀ information and only two bidders is derived
in Section 3. How other-regarding concerns can be detected in our games is
illustrated in Section 4. The experimental protocol to investigate the crowd-
ing out eﬀect of procedural fairness is introduced in Section 5. The data are
described and statistically analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. Procedurally fair rules of bidding
Procedural fairness means that all agents (in the case at hand, all bidders) are
treated in the same way. This excludes that the rules of bidding depend on the
2An even stronger deviation from procedural fairness (in the sense that both axioms are
violated) would be the third price rule. This, however, would require at least three bidders,
rendering payoﬀ comparisons more diﬃcult.
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in the axiomatic characterization of procedurally fair bidding rules, we evaluate
allocation results by stated values, namely the individual bids.
Consider an indivisible commodity which in case of an auction is owned by
an outside seller, and in case of fair division is collectively owned by the group
of bidders   = {1,..., } with   ∈ N,   ≥ 2. Each bidder   ∈   has a private
value  i (≥ 0) for the object to be sold, and she must submit a bid  i (≥ 0). In
case of  i =  i we will say that   bids truthfully. The rules of bidding determine
for all possible bid vectors b = ( 1,..., n) the winner  (b) ∈   who buys the
commodity, and the winner’s payment. In an auction, this payment is the price
 (b) that the winner must pay to the outside seller. In a fair division game, the
payments are the compensations  j(b) that the winner must pay to the losers
  ∕=  (b).
The axiom of envy-free net trades according to bids asserts that according
to her bid no bidder   ∈   prefers the net trade of another bidder in   to her
own one. In case of fair division, this obviously requires  j(b) =  (b) for all
  ∕=  (b) and all possible bid vectors b. For a uniﬁed treatment of auction
and fair division games, we further impose  (b) :=   (b). Envy freeness of net
trades according to bids implies
 w(b) −  (b) ≥ 0 ≥  j −  (b) for all   ∕=  (b)
in case of auction, and
 w(b) −





≥  j −
  − 1
 
 (b) for all   ∕=  (b)
in case of fair division. The left-hand side of these two inequalities means that
 (b) should prefer to buy the commodity at the price  (b) to not trading; the
right-hand side expresses that, according to their stated preferences, the non-
winners   ∕=  (b) prefer not to buy the commodity at the price  (b). Thus, the
winner  (b) is the highest bidder, and the price  (b), which is equally shared
in case of collective ownership, lies between the second highest and the highest
4
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Imposing additionally the axiom of equal stated proﬁts, which aﬃrms that
all proﬁts should be equal according to the stated values, we have that  (b) =
 w(b), i.e., the price must equal the highest bid.
Proposition Envy free net trades and equal proﬁts according to bids require,
for all bid vectors b, to sell the commodity to the highest bidder, i.e.,  w(b) ≥  j
for all   ∕=  (b), at a price equal to the highest bid, i.e.,  (b) =  w(b).
By applying the rules in the Proposition, we guarantee important require-
ments of procedural fairness, namely envy free net trades and equal proﬁts as
evaluated by bids. Does such strong form of procedural fairness already satisfy
people’s other-regarding concerns, therefore allowing for equilibrium behavior?
To answer this question, we consider four diﬀerent allocation rules to which
we refer as game types: First Price Auction (A1), Second Price Auction (A2),
First Price Fair Division Game (F1), and Second Price Fair Division Game
(F2). While the ﬁrst price rule (specifying that the object is awarded to the
highest bidder at a price equal to her own bid) complies with the Proposition
and is therefore procedurally fair, the second price rule (requiring the object to
be awarded to the highest bidder, but at a price equal to the second highest
bid) does not satisfy the axiom of equal stated proﬁts and is not procedurally
fair. We provide a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns by consid-
ering only two bidders who have complete information about the true value  i
of each bidder   = 1,2 for the commodity to be allocated. Payoﬀ comparisons
should be, in this case, rather straightforward.
3. The benchmark solutions
Let   and   (with 0 <   <  ) be the two bidders’ commonly known values
for the object to be sold. Denote by   and   the bidder with value   and
 , respectively. In the experiment both values and bids are integers, what we
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For the ﬁrst price auction (A1), all bids  i (  =   ,  ) not smaller than one’s
own true value are weakly dominated. Eliminating all the weakly dominated
bids of   allows bidder   to win by bidding  V =  . Choosing  V <   oﬀers  
some chances of winning and obtaining a positive payoﬀ. Thus, the equilibrium
vector in weakly undominated strategies for A1 is b∗ = ( ∗
V , ∗
V ) with  ∗
V =  −1
and  ∗
V =  .
For the second price auction (A2), only general truthful bidding is weakly
undominated. The solution, therefore, is b∗ = ( ∗
V , ∗
V ) with  ∗
V =   and  ∗
V =  .
For the ﬁrst price fair division game (F1), all bids  i ≥  i are still weakly
dominated. In fact, if   ∕=  (b) (  =   ,  ), then   does not aﬀect the transfer
payment by varying her bid in the range from her true value to  w(b). If, instead,
  =  (b), then bidding more than the own value only increases the transfer
payment  w(b)/2 to the other bidder. In case of  w(b) >  i + 1,   ∕=  (b), the
winner could lower her bid  w(b) and still win. Hence, in equilibrium  w(b) =
 i+1 must hold for   ∕=  (b). Furthermore, in case of  V <  −1, the   -bidder




V =   − 1 and  ∗
V =   is the benchmark equilibrium in weakly undominated
strategies for F1, which coincides with the solution obtained for A1.
For the second price fair division game (F2), all bids smaller than one’s own
value are weakly dominated because the winner has to pay the competitor’s
bid. Rationally anticipating that the   -bidder will never place a bid lower
than  , the   -bidder should choose  V =   − 1 so as to increase her monetary
compensation. Therefore, the bidding vector b∗ = ( ∗
V , ∗
V ) with  ∗
V =  −1 and
 ∗
V =   is the benchmark equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies for F2.
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium bids  ∗
i (  =   ,  ), equilibrium price  ∗,
and equilibrium payoﬀs  ∗
i of the four game types, separately for the   -bidder
and the   -bidder.
The fact that A1 and A2 yield the same equilibrium price and payoﬀs rep-
6
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i, price  ∗, and payoﬀs  ∗
i for the four game types,
separately for   =   and   =   .
Game type  ∗
V  ∗
V  ∗  ∗
V  ∗
V
A1   − 1     0   −  
A2       0   −  
F1   − 1    
v
2   −
v
2




resents an equivalence result, which is usually established for auctions with
a priori symmetric incomplete information about the bidders’ true valuations
(see, e.g., Wolfstetter, 1996). Moreover, notice that only for F2 the equilib-
rium payoﬀs of the two bidders are rather equal; for all other game types the
  -bidder collects, in equilibrium,   −   more than the   -bidder.
4. Other-regarding concerns in bidding behavior
We focus on two types of other-regarding concerns: equality and eﬃciency
seeking. The solution behavior allows for nearly equality of payoﬀs only in
F2, where the equilibrium payoﬀs of the two bidders diﬀer marginally. In A1
and F1 more equitable payoﬀs would require the   -bidder to deviate from her
equilibrium choice by bidding above  . Conversely, in A2 the   -bidder should
bid above  ∗
V =  . Thus equality seeking can be detected via
 V −  ∗
V =  V −   > 0 for A1 and F1
 V −  ∗
V =  V −   > 0 for A2.
The hypothesis that inequality aversion is more moderate in A1 (the pro-
cedurally fair institution) than in A2 will be tested by comparing the  V −  -
distribution in A1 with the  V − -distribution in A2. A similar comparison for
F1 and F2 is problematic because bidding more than   is what the benchmark
7
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As to eﬃciency (measured by the sum of individual payoﬀs), it requires that
the winner should always be the   -bidder, and that the   -bidder should lower
her bid in A2. As in equilibrium the   -bidder is always the winner, we test
whether, compared to A2 and F2, A1 and F1 render the   -bidder less often the
winner. Furthermore, we test whether the observed price is lower in A2 than in
A1, and whether the price distributions in F1 and F2 do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
due to the missing eﬃciency aspect of the price.
5. Experimental design
In the experiment we set   = 50, and   = 100. These values were denoted
in ECUs (Experimental Currency Unit). Bids could be any integer number
between 30 and 120 ECUs.
Within a session, participants were matched in pairs and played each game
type exactly once (i.e., the four games were run in a within-subject design).
The two members of a pair were assigned their value (either 50 or 100) at the
beginning and kept the same value for all four games. The number of bidders
involved in each game (  = 2) as well as their values were known by all. We
implemented a so-called “perfect stranger” design which ensured that no subject
ever met another subject more than once.
Each of the four games was presented separately in a diﬀerent part of the
experiment. Instructions (reproduced in the appendix) were distributed and
read aloud in each of the four parts, and participants had the chance to go
through control questions and four practice rounds. Once the experimenter
had ensured that everyone had understood the game, subjects submitted their
bids. Only when all participants had made their decisions in one game, the
instructions for the following game were distributed. Subjects did not receive
any feedback or payment until the end of the experimental session. At the end of
8
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received in private their accumulated earnings.
We implemented four diﬀerent sequences in which the games were played.
Because of the similarity of the games, we always had the two auctions and
the two fair division games played in couple. Moreover, we wanted each of
the four games played at the beginning of the sequence because initial play
(uncontaminated by other features) may be important. Thus, we implemented
the following sequences: A1 A2 F1 F2, A2 A1 F2 F1, F1 F2 A1 A2, and F2
F1 A2 A1. This is only a small subset of the 24 possible sequencing variants,
but to run suﬃciently many repetitions of all variants does not appear to be
feasible.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and con-
ducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics (Jena, Germany). The subjects were undergraduate students from the
Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena. They were recruited using the ORSEE
software (Greiner, 2004). Upon entering the laboratory, the subjects were ran-
domly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals.
We ran one session per sequence. Each session involved 32 participants,
matched in pairs. We therefore have 64   -bidders and 64   -bidders for each
game type. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes and the average earnings were
e19.03, inclusive of a e5.00 show-up fee.
6. Results
A series of Wilcoxon rank sum tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests do not
reveal any signiﬁcant diﬀerence among the four sequences in which the games
were played (  > 0.105 always). We can therefore pool the data. Figure 1
displays box plots of the individual bids for each game type, separately for the
  -bidder and the   -bidder (in the ﬁgure “X” represents the average of the
9
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 073Figure 1: Box plots of the individual bids for the four game types






































Let us ﬁrst compare the observed bids with the bidders’ true value so as to assess
whether procedural fairness aﬀects the proportion of truthful bids. In A1 and
F1, undominatedness excludes overbidding with respect to the true value, while
in F2 underbidding with respect to the true value is weakly dominated. Only
in A2 truthful bidding is uniquely undominated. Therefore, according to the
concept of weak dominance, we expect that subjects would, on average, (i) never
bid above their true value under the ﬁrst price rule, whatever the game type
(A1 and F1), (ii) never bid below their true value in F2, and (iii) bid truthfully
in A2.
Table 2 shows the actual average relative deviations from truthful bidding
in each of the four game types, separately for the   -bidder and the   -bidder.
The observed deviations have the predicted sign, indicating that subjects avoid,
10
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 073Table 2: Relative observed diﬀerences between average bids and true values





on average, weakly dominated choices. Exact Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the
null hypothesis that the central tendency of the bid distribution does not diﬀer
from the true value indicate that only   -bidders bid truthfully in A2 (  = 0.218;
all other  s do not exceed 0.014). Furthermore, bids are more distant from the
true value in A1 than in A2, and in F1 than in F2. Speciﬁcally, the relative
diﬀerences between bids and true values are signiﬁcantly more negative for A1
(F1) than for A2 (F2) (  < 0.001 always; Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing
( i −  i)/ i in A1 and A2, and in F1 and F2). Thus, the procedurally fair
pricing rule is less consistent with truthful bidding compared to the unfair one.
The conjecture that procedural fairness crowds in truthful bidding cannot be
conﬁrmed.
6.2. Benchmark bidding
Does procedural fairness “crowd in” solution behavior? Table 3 reports the
average relative diﬀerence, in absolute value, between the individual bids and
the equilibrium bid.3 Bids are in line with the benchmark in A2 and F1 for the
  -bidder (  = 0.218 and 0.196, respectively). The most dramatic deviations
from the benchmark are found for the   -bidder in F2 and the   -bidder in F1.
In 3 out of 4 comparisons, the ﬁrst price rule induces lower average devia-
tions from the benchmark than the second price rule. However, according to
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the deviations are not statistically diﬀerent when
3For each game and bidder type, we average over the diﬀerence in absolute value between
the individual bid and the benchmark bid.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 073Table 3: Relative observed average deviations from the equilibrium benchmark
Game type ∣ V −  ∗






comparing A1 and A2 (  = 0.337 for   ;   = 0.089 for   ).   -bidders devi-
ate signiﬁcantly less from  ∗
V in F1 than in F2, whereas the opposite holds for
  -bidder (both p-values < 0.001). Therefore, except for the   -bidders in the
fair division games, procedural fairness induces more equilibrium behavior, al-
though not always in a signiﬁcant way. The crowding in of rational benchmark
behavior can only be qualitatively and to some extent conﬁrmed.
6.3. Testing for other-regarding concerns
To assess the relevance of the price rule for equality seeking behavior we compare
bV −v
v in A1 with
bV −v
v in A2. The former diﬀerence is a standardized measure
of how much of her margin bidder   is ready to sacriﬁce to reduce inequality
favoring herself. The latter diﬀerence is a standardized measure of how much
of   ’s margin bidder   is ready to sacriﬁce to reduce inequality that is to
  ’s disadvantage. Obviously, A1 is much more demanding in terms of equality
seeking than A2 because   must accept a personal cost in order to render her
payoﬀ more equal to   ’s payoﬀ.
The average
bV −v
v in A1 equals 0.098, while the average
bV −v
v in A2 equals
0.009. The two distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent according to a Wilcoxon
rank sum test (  < 0.001). Thus, the procedurally fair ﬁrst price rule seems to
induce more equality seeking than the second price rule.
A ﬁrst measure of the eﬀects of alternative pricing rules on eﬃciency can be
obtained by looking at how often the   -bidder is the winner in each game type.
12
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In the fair division games,   wins less often under the ﬁrst price rule (89.1%
in F1 vs. 96.9% in F2). A Fisher’s exact test shows that alternative price rules
do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the number of winners (  = 0.365 for A1 vs. A2;
  = 0.164 for F1 vs. F2).
As to the price paid by the winners, the average price is higher in A1 than
in A2 (59.875 vs. 49.078). This questions the equivalence result for symmetric
private values auctions (for a survey see Kagel, 1995). The ﬁrst price rule
induces a higher average price also in the fair division games (81.547 in F1
vs. 65.0 in F2).4
7. Conclusions
Like in constitutional design (which should promote equal voting rights and
equal chances of promotion) and sport contests (where the ranking rules should
not arbitrarily favor one athlete or team), also in market design one ought to
meet our requirements of procedural fairness. In this paper, we have deﬁned
procedural fairness rigorously by providing an axiomatic characterization of fair
bidding rules.
More speciﬁcally, we have imposed two axioms (envy-freeness of net trades
and equal proﬁts according to bids) and referred to bidding rules satisfying
both axioms as procedurally fair. We have then considered rules that violate
only one axiom, namely the axiom of equal stated proﬁts. This can be justiﬁed
by the fact that equality seeking (as postulated by equity theory; Homans,
1961) or inequality aversion (Bolton, 1991; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000) is often claimed to be a strong and purely consequentialistic
type of other-regarding concerns.
We were interested in exploring whether, compared to rules that do not
4Wilcoxon rank sum tests show that the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant for both the
auctions and the fair division games (  < 0.001 for both comparisons).
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more rational bidding, and (ii) mitigates other-regarding concerns. Overall, we
could not convincingly conﬁrm either (i) or (ii). Informing participants about
the procedural fairness of the diﬀerent pricing rules, before allowing them to
endogenously choose one, may yield stronger eﬀects. This however will have to
be explored by future research. So far, we can only conclude that participants
do not seem to react very sensitively to the removal of one aspect of procedu-
ral fairness, although procedurally fair rules induce more rational benchmark
behavior.
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This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) that we used
for the sequence A1 A2 F1 F2. The instructions for the other sequences were
adapted accordingly.
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max Planck
Institute of Economics. Please switch oﬀ your mobile and remain quiet. It is strictly
forbidden to talk to the other participants. Whenever you have a question, please raise
your hand and one of the experimenters will come to your aid.
You will receive e5.00 for having shown up on time. Beyond this you can earn more
money. There is also a small possibility that you end up with a loss. The show-up
fee and any additional amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in cash
at the end of the experiment. Payments are carried out privately, i.e., with the others
unaware of the extent of your earnings. During the experiment we shall speak of ECUs
(Experimental Currency Unit) rather than euros. The conversion rate between them
is 10 ECUs = 1 euro.
The experiment consists of four parts. The instructions for the ﬁrst part follow on
this page. The instructions for the second, third and fourth part will be distributed
after all participants have completed the ﬁrst, second and third part, respectively.
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE FIRST PART
You will be placed in a group of two people (a pair). You and the other person in your
pair will take part in an auction in which you can purchase a ﬁctitious object that will
be resold to the experimenters.
For both you and the other person in your pair the reselling value of the object
being auctioned can be either 50 ECUs or 100 ECUs. With 50% probability your
private reselling value will be 50 ECUs and the private reselling value of the other
bidder in your pair will be 100 ECUs, and with 50% probability your private reselling
value will be 100 ECUs and the private reselling value of the other bidder in your
pair will be 50 ECUs. You will learn your own and the other’s reselling value at the
beginning of the experiment.
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After learning your individual reselling value, you will have to place a bid for the object
being auctioned. Whatever your private value (50 or 100 ECUs), your bid can be any
integer number between 30 ECUs and 120 ECUs (i.e., 30, 31, 32, ..., 118, 119, 120).
Your experimental proﬁt
The bidder with the highest bid will buy the object and pay a price equal to the own
bid. Then he/she will sell the object to the experimenters and will receive his/her own
reselling value. The price paid by the buyer will be collected by the experimenters.
Thus, the proﬁt of the buyer is:
Proﬁt of the buyer = own private reselling value − own bid.
The other bidder (who does not buy the object) does not pay anything and does
not receive the object. Thus, his/her proﬁt is zero:
Proﬁt of the non-buyer = 0.
In case of a tie (i.e., two equal bids), a random draw will determine the buyer.
Note that if you are the buyer and your bid is higher than your private reselling
value, then your proﬁt is negative, i.e. you can suﬀer a loss. Suppose, for example, that
your own reselling value is 100 ECUs. If you bid 110 ECUs and the other person in
your pair bids 105 ECUs, you buy the object (because 110 > 105) and pay 110 ECUs.
Your proﬁt would then be 100 − 110 = −10.
The information you receive
You will be informed about both whether or not you are the buyer and your ﬁrst part’s
proﬁt at the end of today’s session (i.e., after the fourth part).
Your ﬁnal payoﬀ
At the end of the experiment, your proﬁts from the four parts will be added up and
the resulting sum will be converted to euros. In case of negative cumulative proﬁts,
the show-up fee will cover you for losses not greater than e5.00 (= 50 ECUs). If your
losses exceed the show-up fee, you can decide between paying the losses from your own
pocket and completing an additional task at the end of the experiment. This additional
task consists of searching and counting a speciﬁc letter in a lengthy text with several
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task serves only to repay losses and not to earn extra money.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions to
ensure your understanding of the rules of the ﬁrst part of the experiment. Once every-
body has answered all questions correctly, four practice rounds will be held so that you
may familiarize yourself with the dynamics of the experiment. During these rounds,
you will not be matched with a person in this room, but the computer will choose the
other’s decisions from randomly generated values. The result of these rounds will not
be relevant for your ﬁnal payoﬀ.
Please remain quietly seated during the whole experiment. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand now. When you have ﬁnished reading the instructions
for this part of the experiment and if there are no questions, please click “ok” on your
computer screen.
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE SECOND PART
In this second part you will face a similar situation as in the ﬁrst part. You will be
one of two bidders in an auction in which a ﬁctitious object is for sale. Your private
reselling value and the private reselling value of the other bidder in your pair will be
the same as in the ﬁrst part. You and the other person in your pair will have to place
a bid for the object being auctioned. Whatever your private value, your bid can be
any integer number between 30 ECUs and 120 ECUs. The highest bidder will buy the
object. The price paid by the buyer will be collected by the experimenters. In case of
a tie, a random draw will determine the buyer.
Main diﬀerences with respect to the ﬁrst part
1. You will be matched with a diﬀerent person.
2. The buyer must pay a price equal to the bid of the other person in his/her pair.
Thus the proﬁt of the buyer is now:
Proﬁt of the buyer = own private reselling value − other’s bid.
The proﬁt of the non-buyer is zero, as before.
Even in this second part, if you are the buyer, you can suﬀer a loss. Suppose, for
example, that your own reselling value is 100 ECUs. If you bid 110 ECUs and the
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pay 105 ECUs. Your proﬁt would then be 100 − 105 = −5.
Before the second part starts, you will have to answer some control questions
and then go through four practice rounds so that you may familiarize yourself with
the dynamics of this part. As before, during the practice rounds, the computer will
determine randomly the other’s decisions and the result of these rounds will not be
relevant for your ﬁnal payoﬀ.
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE THIRD PART
In this third part you will face a similar situation as in the previous parts. You will be
one of two bidders in an auction in which a ﬁctitious object is for sale. Your private
reselling value and the private reselling value of the other bidder in your pair will be
the same as in the ﬁrst and second part. You and the other person in your pair will
have to place a bid for the object being auctioned. Whatever your private value, your
bid can be any integer number between 30 ECUs and 120 ECUs. The highest bidder
will buy the object. In case of a tie, a random draw will determine the buyer.
Main diﬀerences with respect to the second part
1. You will be matched with a diﬀerent person (with whom you have never inter-
acted).
2. The buyer must pay a price equal to his/her own bid (as in the ﬁrst part).
3. The price paid by the buyer will not be collected by the experimenters, but
equally divided between the bidders. Thus the proﬁt of the buyer is now:
Proﬁt of the buyer = own private reselling value − own bid + 1
2 own bid =
= own private reselling value − 1
2 own bid.
4. The other bidder (who does not buy the object) does not pay anything, and
does not receive the object. But he/she receives half the price paid by the buyer
(i.e. half the other’s bid). Thus, his/her proﬁt is now:
Proﬁt of the non-buyer = 1
2 other’s bid.
Even in this part, if you are the buyer, you can suﬀer a loss. Suppose, for example,
that your own reselling value is 50 ECUs. If you bid 110 ECUs and the other person
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and get back 1
2110 = 55. Your proﬁt would then be 50 − 55 = −5.
Before the third part starts, you will have to answer some control questions and
then go through four practice rounds so that you may familiarize yourself with the dy-
namics of this part. As before, during the practice rounds, the computer will determine
randomly the other’s decisions and the result of these rounds will not be relevant for
your ﬁnal payoﬀ.
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE FOURTH PART
In this fourth part you will face a similar situation as in the third part. You will be
one of two bidders in an auction in which a ﬁctitious object is for sale. Your private
reselling value and the private reselling value of the other bidder in your pair will be
the same as in the previous parts. You and the other person in your pair will have to
place a bid for the object being auctioned. Whatever your private value, your bid can
be any integer number between 30 ECUs and 120 ECUs. The highest bidder will buy
the object. The price paid by the buyer will be equally divided between bidders. In
case of a tie, a random draw will determine the buyer.
Main diﬀerences with respect to the third part
1. You will be matched with a diﬀerent person (with whom you have never inter-
acted).
2. The buyer must pay a price equal to the bid of the other person in his/her pair.
3. Since the price paid by the buyer (i.e. the other’s bid) will be equally divided
between the bidders, the proﬁt of the buyer is:
Proﬁt of the buyer = own private reselling value − other’s bid + 1
2 other’s bid =
= own private reselling value − 1
2 other’s bid.
4. The other bidder (who does not buy the object) receives half the price paid by
the buyer, which now is half his/her own bid. Thus, his/her proﬁt is:
Proﬁt of the non-buyer = 1
2 own bid.
Even in this part, if you are the buyer, you can suﬀer a loss. Suppose, for example,
that your own reselling value is 50 ECUs. If you bid 110 ECUs and the other person
21
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 073in your pair bids 105 ECUs, you buy the object (because 110 > 105), pay 105 ECUs,
and get back 1
2105 = 52.5. Your proﬁt would then be 50 − 52.5 = −2.5.
Before the fourth part starts, you will have to answer some control questions and
then go through four practice rounds so that you may familiarize yourself with the dy-
namics of this part. As before, during the practice rounds, the computer will determine
randomly the other’s decisions and the result of these rounds will not be relevant for
your ﬁnal payoﬀ.
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